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Abstract
Many people do not deliberately act to protect the data on their Smartphones.
The most obvious explanation for a failure to behave securely is that the appro-
priate mechanisms are unusable. Does this mean usable mechanisms will auto-
matically be adopted? Probably not! Poor usability certainly plays a role, but
other factors also contribute to non-adoption of precautionary mechanisms and
behaviours. We carried out a series of interviews to determine justifications for
non-adoption of security precautions, specifically in the smartphone context, and
developed a model of Smartphone precaution non-adoption. The most interest-
ing finding was the fact that the media does not really play the expected role in
raising awareness of Smartphone security issues. We propose that future work
should investigate the use of media awareness campaigns to address the various
identified misconceptions and justifications.
c 2015 Springer. The final publication is available at link.springer.com’.
1 Introduction
The usable security field, starting with Whitten and Tygar’s seminal paper in
1999 [49], identified poor usability as the primary obstacle preventing the use
of email ancryption. Poor usability was subsequently blamed for the low uptake
of other security and privacy measures [5,9,25]. Improving usability, on its own,
while necessary, might not be su cient, as highlighted by a number of researchers
working in non-smartphone contexts in the last few years [18,20,21,40,41,42].
It is necessary to investigate other justifications for non-adoption in the
smartphone context. Only then can we devise acceptable security measures that
smartphone owners might be more willing to adopt [45]. We carried out a se-
ries of semi-structured interviews to explore possible explanations for each of the
Fig. 1. Progression to Adoption of Smartphone Precautions
meta-categories of non-adoption of smartphone precautions. Based on our analy-
sis we derived a model depicting the progression towards smartphone precaution
adoption (Fig. 1). This model serves as basis for future measures as suggested
in future work. In summary, this paper’s contributions are:
1. Identification of meta-categories of explanations from related literature that
could lead to non-adoption of precautionary security and privacy preserva-
tion measures (Section 2).
2. Exploration of each of those categories in the smartphone context, based on
semi-structured interviews (Section 3) — see Fig. 1 (Section 4).
2 Methodology
We conducted a series of semi-structured interviews to investigate justifications
for non-adoption, inaction or insecure action. The interviews were conducted
either in person or via Skype. On average, an interview took 41 minutes, with
the shortest interview taking 26 minutes and the longest 60 minutes. The par-
ticipants were promised no reimbursement for participation in the study.
2.1 Interview Protocol
The semi-structured interviews comprised four phases which are described in the
following paragraphs.
Phase 1: Introduction. Welcome, explain what the study is about, gather
demographic data and general information about smartphone experience.
Phase 2: General security threats. Questions were posed to explore their
knowledge of smartphone security threats. They were asked which security threats
they were aware of, which countermeasures could mitigate, how e↵ective they
are, and whether they themselves used them. Non-specific responses were pur-
sued to ensure that we gauged their actual understanding. They were then asked
about the possibility that they would become a target. If they perceived the risk
to be high, but did not use any countermeasures, they were asked to elabo-
rate on this. The participants were asked whether they had experienced security
problems themselves, and what they perceived the di↵erences between smart-
phones and computers to be. We also asked what important data was stored on
their smartphones, and who, and to which extent, should be responsible for the
security of the smartphone.
Phase 3: Specific countermeasures. During this phase the participants
were asked about specific practices or tools used to protect sensitive data on
smartphones. These were: (1) usage of screen lock, (2) updating the operating
system or other software and (3) usage of antivirus software. In each case the
participant was asked whether he or she used the tool. If they did not, their
reasons were drawn out. If they did, we asked about why they chose to use it,
how they personalised it, and if there was some choice, as is the case for antivirus,
how they chose which one to use.
Phase 4: Specific threats. During this phase participants were asked about
specific threats that could impact the privacy of data stored on smartphones,
based upon the guidelines from Federal O ce for Information Security4. The
threats discussed were: (1) the smartphone being lost or stolen, (2) app-related
threats, (3) sharing of location-based data, (4) QR codes, (5) links in SMSs,
(6) connecting to non-secured WLAN and (7) Bluetooth usage. We wanted to
explore awareness of data privacy, the implications of others gaining access to
their data and actions they took as precautions. If they took no action we asked
questions to help us to understand their reasoning. If they did take action we
explored the extent and e cacy of the action.
2.2 Ethics
Ethical requirements for research involving human participants are provided by
an ethics commission at the university5. Participants were initially told that the
study was about smartphone usage. They were not told until after the inter-
view that the research was focused on smartphone security. This was done in
order avoid framing responses. Permission was gained to record the interview
anonymously. Parents consented on behalf of underage participants.
2.3 Participants
Smartphone owners were recruited via email, according to the snowball principle.
A total of 20 participants were recruited, with a perfect gender balance ranging
from 12 to 65 years of age, with a mean age of 33.2 years. Five participants were
either students, researchers or employers in the field of computer science with






We planned to carry out an interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) of
our interviews. To support this we needed a set of pre-existing themes to drive
the initial classification. Researchers have reported a number of non-usability
related factors that are likely to hinder the adoption of security and privacy
solutions in other contexts. For example, end-to-end email encryption [40], web
tracking [42], secure passwords [47], anonymizing networks [12], eID [20], com-
pliance with policies in organizations [18,41]. We started o↵ with [40], who at-
tempted to understand non-use of security measures in the email context. The
authors identified the following progression to usage: lack of awareness, lack of
concern, limited knowledge of threats, not feeling compelled to take action, lack
of know-how, and not being side-tracked. We then consulted to other studies
to determine whether we ought to extend this list. [42], for example, identified
a di↵erent set of categories explaining the low uptake of precautions against
identification/tracking on the Internet. They suggest that privacy issues do not
correlate with identification and tracking issues; lack of awareness of informa-
tion being transmitted; lack of awareness of how such information can be used
to identify/track people, lack of concern about being identified/tracked; lack of
awareness of countermeasures; being side-tracked by other motivations. Other
studies did not suggest any further categories [2,17,36,45], so we settled on the
following five context-neutral categories of reasons for non-use.
(1) Lack of awareness. One reason for poor adoption of privacy and/or se-
curity measures is that people lack awareness of the privacy and security threats.
(2) Lack of concern. A number of people are indeed aware of potential
privacy and/or security threats but do not take any precautions because they
are unconcerned.
(3) Lack of self-e cacy Some people are indeed aware and concerned but
lack self-e cacy (not feeling able to protect themselves).
(4) Lack of compulsion. Some people are aware, concerned, and have the
requisite self-e cacy but do not feel compelled to act.
(5) Lack of perseverance6. Some people are aware, concerned, have the
requisite self-e cacy and feel in general compelled to act but they get side-
tracked.
3 Results
The interviews were transcribed (some by the authors, some by other members
of the research group) to support analysis. Responses were analysed using semi-
open coding using the categories enumerated in the previous Section. Two au-
thors independently reviewed the transcripts and assigned explanations to codes
6 This is the getting side-tracked explanation, mentioned by [40] and [42]. We felt that,
in order to express this as a deficiency, the use of the term perseverance was more
appropriate in this categorisation.
and codes to categories. If several concepts were mentioned, each was coded un-
der the appropriate code/category. The assignments were discussed and agreed
upon by the authors.
In the following subsections, we report on whether we found evidence for each
category in the smartphone context and provide details about the identified sub-
categories. Since our analysis was qualitative we do not provide tallies of quotes
in each category.
3.1 Lack of Awareness
An essential pre-requisite to adoption of precautionary behaviour is awareness
of threats. There is a clear lack of awareness of smartphone-related threats, with
participants either completely unaware of threats, or only aware of threats that
require physical access to their smartphone. Some study participants, when asked
about smartphone-related threats they were aware of were not able to name any,
as the following quotes show:
“No, I wouldn’t know where I could have problems here. There might be
something, but nothing comes to mind at the moment”
We identified the following sub-categories (codes) as possible explanations
for why people lack awareness: (a) smartphones are considered to be phones,
not computers; and (b) poor media coverage.
It’s a Phone, not a Computer. Some participants explained that their smart-
phone was a phone rather than a computer. They had, as a consequence, not
made the mental connection to the need for precautions, as the following quotes
demonstrate:
“Yes, I consider it more of a phone. So, you can make phone calls, write
short messages, and it also has the advantage that you can access the
Internet. But, yes, it is mostly for communicating, and is not like a
laptop, where one works or writes stu↵, so, I use it in a di↵erent way.”
Poor Media Coverage. Some participants complained that attacks on smart-
phones did not get as much media coverage as threats to laptops or desktops.
Most had heard about malware on PCs, but not on smartphones. Those who
had heard of attacks mentioned attacks on corporations and politicians, but not
any involving private citizens, as shown in the following quote:
“I have heard, or maybe one has heard, on the TV, or has read about,
some attacks on companies, some hackers, but I haven’t heard that this
also happens in private life”
3.2 Lack of Concern
For awareness to lead to action, there must be a level of concern, a perception
of vulnerability. We identified a number of sub-categories (codes), i.e. reasons
why people were unconcerned: (a) their own insignificance, (b) low probability
of becoming a victim. (c) underestimating security- and privacy-related conse-
quences, (d) some privacy ‘violations’ being acceptable, (e) that they themselves
were not responsible for taking precautions, (f) device loss being more worrying
than privacy, These sub-categories are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Their Own Insignificance. Some of participants seemed unconcerned because
they believed that they were not important enough to interest attackers, or that
they did not have any interesting data on their smartphones that could merit
an attack. Examples of relevant quotes are:
“Honestly, I personally think that no one would target me, because I
believe that I do not have anything important on my smartphone”
Low Probability of Becoming a Victim. Some responses indicated that the
participants underestimated their vulnerability: the probability that they would
fall victim to attacks. This underestimation led to their not behaving securely
and not using privacy-protecting tools, as these quotes show:
“I simply believe that out of number of internet-banking users, the number
of people that have experienced problems is so small that it results in small
percentage”
Underestimating Consequences. Participants who were aware that their
data was at risk did not seem to anticipate the concrete harm that could result.
They were not aware of what attackers could do with their data, which data was
of interest (and why) or did not consider the consequences to be particularly
serious. Example quotes are:
“Honestly, I do not have concerns, because this data may be important for
me, mostly personal stu↵, but there are no state secrets in my emails, if
someone wants to read them or something, he, in my opinion, does not
get much from it [..] Therefore I have few worries about the data.”
Some Privacy Violations are Acceptable. The interviews revealed that
benefits of behaving securely could potentially be o↵set for various reasons. Con-
crete reasons are mentioned in the following quotes:
“If it is an app that I absolutely need, then I need to ponder. Then I say,
I take it, even though it is not secure.”
Some participants were aware that ‘others’ could gain access to their sensitive
data but they were not concerned because they thought they had nothing to
hide, as the following quote shows:
“It would not matter to me at all if someone reads along with me. I have
nothing to hide, it would not bother me.”
Trust in Someone Else to Take Responsibility. During the interviews par-
ticipants were specifically asked to name entities which ought to be responsible
for smartphone security. Participants named developers, smartphone providers,
play stores and state institutions, as being responsible. This suggests that it
still does not occur to many users that they have to act deliberately to protect
themselves, while they trust someone else to take care of security risks.
“Ahm, ok, basically, if there are extreme vulnerabilities, also problems,
then I think, it should be regulated legally.[..] that the manufacturers
develop the devices in a way that it is not possible.”
In particular, some participants overestimated the level of scrutiny and the
success rate of malware checks of either Apple or Google, that the apps o↵ered
for download on app stores were supposed to go though. Thus, assuming that
no malicious apps could enter the store, they quite reasonably did not take any
protective actions themselves. The following quotes confirm this misunderstand-
ing:
“So, I hope at least, that they do this [check the apps], that they have some
filter criteria, so that they do not sell apps that are dubious, but how well
they pay attention to to privacy, I honestly do not know.”
Device Loss is more Worrying Than Privacy. When asked about their
concerns with respect to their smartphones, no one mentioned anything about
privacy and only a few mentioned security. Instead a number said that the main
problem would be losing the device itself, since that would lead to loss of revenue,
as confirmed by the following quote:
“As long as it is not stolen, I do not worry.”
Some were concerned about the potential loss of valuable data on their smart-
phones, such as their contacts, photos, music etc (in terms of availability). Ex-
ample quotes are:
“So, honestly, I think for me the device itself is more important, because I
think, oh no, it cost so much. I would only think about the data sometime
later, and then worry about my contacts and my images.”
Several mentioned an adversary using their smartphone to make calls or send
text messages, that also would cost them something as confirmed by the following
quote:
“Good, I would immediately lock the card. So that no one can use it. [...]
Good, I would also go to the police, but I believe this has nothing to do
with it.”
3.3 Lack of Self-E cacy.
Despite recognizing the need to act in order to protect themselves, people can
still fail to act, if they do not possess the know-how or self confidence to take
action. This leads to their not using necessary measures, or not being able to use
them properly and e↵ectively. The following sub-categories were identified: (a)
not having come across the applicable security measures, (b) having misplaced
faith in e cacy of sub-optimal, ine↵ective or incomplete solutions, (c) believing
that precautions are futile, or (d) lacking the confidence required to start using
the measures.
Lack of Knowledge. Some of the participants did not seem to know how
to protect themselves, or what actions to take against threats they were aware
of. For example, some were unaware of the existence of antivirus software on
smartphones, or did not understand the purpose of the app permission screen.
Example quotes:
“I do not know how I could protect myself from it.”
“I cannot judge at all whether an app is secure or not.”
Others complained about the level of pre-existing security-related knowledge
that was required:
“I do not find it very obvious, also what they write about security, it is
never very clear or understandable for laymen, what is allowed and what
is not allowed.”
“The problem is, that one does not understand the things that they
write there, unless one becomes acquainted with the topic of security, so
one could only trust that whatever is written there is secure.”
The more advanced measures, such as the option to remotely track the stolen
device or wiping data from it, or encryption of the data on smartphone, were
hardly ever mentioned, indicating that the majority were unaware of such mea-
sures.
Other participants, although clearly aware of the existence of smartphone
security threats, demonstrated misconceptions with respect to specific threats,
such as using non-secured WLAN as the following quote shows:
“I do not have the feeling that anyone can access my computer or my
phone better on non-secured WLAN than on secured.”
Misplaced Faith in E cacy of Solutions. Some participants believed that
they already used their smartphones securely, and that they did not require
additional measures. For example, they did not use the screen lock since they
always had their phone on their person, as the following quote supports:
“I have my phone always in my pants pocket, and I believe that no one
can easily get it.”
They did not use antivirus software because they believed that their careful
usage of their phone (i.e. not installing many apps) prevented them from getting
a virus, as the following quotes show:
“I consider antivirus software to be important when you download stu↵
that you might install on your computer or with which you do something.
I do not do this on the phone at all. So, I read emails, or read news and
go on the internet to look something up, but I never install stu↵ on my
phone. ”
Some of participants believed that since they had not experienced any security
issues so far, it meant that their way of using the smartphone must be secure
(for example, they had not used any antivirus software so far and nothing bad
had happened). Example quotes are:
“I did not have any negative experiences on my smartphone, that some
trojans or something was installed on smartphones because there were
no antivurus. I can’t recall reading anything about it. Therefore I didn’t
consider it to be important.”
Futility of Precautions. Some participants were sceptical about whether the
existing precautionary measures were indeed capable of protecting them. These
participants were unlikely to use precautions since they did not believe that this
would protect them e↵ectively. Example quotes are:
“I think that at least these big players [Apple, Google, Windows, Black-
berry], or one of them, could attack me if they wanted to.”
Lack of Confidence. For some participants the lack of self-e cacy can be
explained by the fact that they did not have the confidence to engage with
precautionary tools or measures or even to attempt to use those they were aware
of. Their confidence might have been shaken by a prior inability to use software,
for example
[on antivirus] “I would need to ask someone to download or install it for
me.”
[on switching to some more secure alternative for the app they use] “Yes,
it would be relatively cumbersome to have to familiarize myself with it.
[..]If it were a lot simpler, it would of course be tempting to do this. It is
though still a little bit too much for people that have to become acquainted
with it.”
3.4 Lack of Compulsion
Some participants, despite being aware of the threats and of the precautionary
measures, cited other factors that kept them from adopting those measures. The
following sub-categories have been identified: (a) inconvenience, (b) negative past
experiences with security measures, (c) financial cost.
Inconvenience. Inconvenience was a strong theme. Many referred to the e↵ort
that would be required that would hinder their usage of their smartphone. The
most frequent references were to the screen lock. They said they would have to
enter the code each time they wanted to use the phone, and this was clearly
unpalatable. Example quotes that support this sub category are:
“Because I am irritated that I have to constantly enter this, around 50 times
a day.”
Sometimes they used a PIN instead of something stronger because the stronger
mechanism was too e↵ortful, as this quote indicates:
“I think it is more secure than the PIN, but it is too e↵ortful.”
Some did not change their access control secrets regularly even though they
were aware of the fact that they ought to do this. They were worried about
forgetting but also resented the e↵ort required to think up a new password.
“I can suggest that I would not do it out of a desire for convenience.
That is, out of convenience or forgetfulness, that I forget that I have to
do this.”
“Besides, one has to think of new passwords every time; this is horrible.”
Finally, some did not install essential updates to their operating systems even
though they knew they should. They cited inconvenience, as the following ex-
ample quote demonstrates:
“Yes, since I also have to work with the device or use it. It is not so,
that complete functions are not available, instead, I can still work with
it, and when I have a quiete minute, then I do the update.”
Negative Past Experiences. Based on past experience, some participants
expressed concerns about existing solutions hindering the functionality of their
smartphones, such as a loss of data as a result of an update, or antivirus software
making the phone work too slowly. This discouraged or deterred action, despite
awareness and concern. Quotes that support this subcategory are:
“Antivirus software makes my phone too slow if it runs in the background
all the time, therefore I decline to use it.”
Financial Cost. The cost of security- and privacy-protection tools was some-
times an obstacle and deterred action. An example quote is:
“There might be some antivirus software that one has to pay for, I leave
it alone. If I somehow find free antivirus software, and I read that it
delivers value, then I would install it”.
3.5 Lack of Perseverance
We identified the following sub-categories: (a) taking their cues from their friends,
and (b) not wanting to be paranoid.
I Trust What My Friends Do. Several participants mentioned relying on the
experiences and trusting the recommendations of their peers in making security-
and privacy-related decisions. The fact that their peers consider an action safe
would presumably make it safe for them too. Example quotes are:
“Apps that I have on it are just the apps used by many people, also
by many in my social circle. And somehow it creates trust, so that one
thinks, ok, if they all have it, than it must be secure and not do anything
bad.”
Not Wanting to be Paranoid. There is a general fear of mental illness in
society [10]. This might have prompted some participants to be worried about
being considered paranoid by engaging in too-obvious or too-stringent security
behaviours, as the following quote shows:
“On one side, it to some extent naivety, and on the other side, it is
to some extent, one can not permanently go on with such distrust, and
always with these thoughts in head, I have to be absolutely sure, that no
data falls in wrong hands. One can also become paranoid with it.”
“The problem is, that one does not understand the things that they write
there, unless one becomes acquainted with the topic of security, so one
could only trust that whatever is written there is secure.”
4 Model of Precaution Adoption
Based on our findings we have derived a model of smartphone precaution adop-
tion, as depicted in Figures 1 and 2. The model should
– enable researchers to better understand people’s decisions in the context of
smartphone precaution and secure behaviours.
– serve as a launching pad to encourage future investigations into smartphone-
specific precautionary and secure behaviours.
The identified five categories are not orthogonal, nor do we insist on the ordering
depicted in Figure 1. For example, it may be that concern comes after self-
e cacy, and does not precede it.
Fig. 2. Categories of explanations for non-adoption in a Smartphone context. Citations
for Sub-categories are those who mentioned a related finding in a di↵erent context:
either non-smartphone or not mental model related.
The subcategory poor media coverage of smartphone security issues is new.
We carried out a brief investigation into the appearance of related articles in the
news in Germany (the interview participants were Germans): A Google News
search carried out on the 14th April 2015 for “Smartphone Security Precautions”
(with quotes) delivered no results. Without the quotes a number of results ap-
peared. On the first page only the last item actually reported on precautions to
be taken by Android owners7, and that was published two months before.
Not many papers in usable security area seem to mention the role of the
media. Some notable exceptions are Furnell and Evangelatos [16] and [32] who
do mention the media’s role with respect to public awareness of biometrics.
Certainly this is an area for future focus if we are to make users more aware of
7 http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Sicher-surfen-trotz-Android-4-3-
2552659.html
the existence of smartphone-related threats, and the appopriate precautions to
take.
The identified five categories are not orthogonal, nor do we insist on the
ordering depicted in Figure 1. For example, it may be that concern comes after
self-e cacy, and does not precede it.
A particular person’s explanation for non-adoption might come from di↵erent
subcategories, depending on context. For example, consider Johnny wanting to
use an unsecured Wifi. He might use it simply because he does not know that
this is risky (lack of awareness).
5 Related Work
A number of researchers have studied mobile security from an end-user per-
spective. Di↵erent aspects of user behaviour have been evaluated, to attempt to
understand the mental models that users have with respect to smartphone usage
and secure behaviour in the smartphone context. Other than our research, these
papers did not aim to identify reasons for non-adoption of smartphone precau-
tions. In case of relevant findings for our research, this was mentioned already
in the previous section. Therefore, we mention in this section only their research
focus and explain why this di↵ers from ours.
A study to evaluate how users protect their data on their smartphones was
conducted by Muslukhov et al. [34]. The researchers posed three questions: 1)
what types of data users store on their phones; 2) how sensitive or valuable
each data type is; 3) what users do to protect their data. The evaluation was
also carried out using semi-structured interviews. The results have shown that
many users tend to store various types of sensitive data on their smartphones
such as passwords to various services in the apps on their phones. Yet many
do not actively protect the data. Thus, this paper mainly serves as motivation
for our work as well as input for future work on how to address the identified
justifications.
Lazou and Weir [30] conducted a quantitative study using a multiple-choice
questionnaire to evaluate the security practices of smartphone users, the types
of sensitive data stored on the smartphones, and users’ security awareness. The
focus of the study to was to evaluate the extent to which the participants are
aware of smartphone security and use protection tools, but it did not look into the
reasons for either lack of awareness or failure to use the tools. Other quantitative
studies with similar goals were conducted in [38,36].
A great deal of research has been carried out examining app permissions.
Felt et al. [15] reported on users’ perceptions of permissions on di↵erent op-
erating systems; Kelley et al. [27] used semi-structured interviews to evaluate
how users perceived app permissions, whether they paid attention to them, and
overall, which decisions they made while installing apps; and Lin et al. [31] ex-
amined the mental models of smartphone users related to privacy expectations
with respect to individual smartphone apps. Their results include usability and
understandability issues as well as reasons for non-consideration of permissions.
Their research did not consider other smartphone threats.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have known for at least the last 15 years that poor usability deters use of
security-related software. Yet other factors also deter adoption and it is impor-
tant to understand the nature of these factors too so that we can address them.
We identified five context-neutral causative categories from the non-smartphone
literature. We then conducted interviews and analysed them to determine whether
these same categories manifested in the smartphone arena. We did confirm them,
and – more interestingly – identified an exhaustive list of sub-categories in each
of the four meta-categories.
The most interesting finding was identification of the role the media has to
play in raising public awareness. Investigating this will be the direction of our
future research. On a related note, it was interesting that some participants
said that they became more concerned about security after the interview. They
said that that they would subsequently look into ways to protect themselves. It
is heartening to know that our research raised awareness, helping people up at
least the first of the adoption steps. It also highlights the importance of awareness
raising in this and related security contexts.
[1,14,7] [39,42,40,37,11,18,44,48,28,17,20,2,24,26,19,29,43][6][3][23] [13] [4] [35,36] [33] [22] [8][34] [46]
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